Politics of Delegation (Heftet (myke permer))

There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policy makers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.

Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions, Mark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet; delegation to supranational institutions - why, how and with what consequences?, Jonas Tallberg; rational fictions - central bank independence and the social logic of delegation, Kathleen R. McNamara; constitutional courts and parliamentary democracy, Alec Stone Sweet; institutional choice and bureaucratic autonomy in Germany, Marian Dohler; delegation to independent regulatory agencies - pressures, functions and contextual mediation, Mark Thatcher; the unanticipated consequences of creating independent competition agencies, Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle; judicial delegation doctrines - the US, Britain and France, Martin Shapiro; learning from the Americanists (again) - theory and method in the study of delegation, Mark A. Pollack.