List of contributors; Editor's preface; 1. Foundations of game theory Kenneth J. Binmore; 2. Refinements of Nash equilibrium Eric van Damme; Discussion of 'Foundations of game theory', Kenneth G. Binmore and 'Refinements of Nash equilibrium,' Eric van Damme Eddie Dekel; 3. Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games Drew Fudenberg; 4. Repeated games: cooperation and rationality David G. Pearce; Comments on the interpretation of repeated games theory Ariel Rubinstein; 5. Implementation, contracts and renegotiation in environments with complete information John Moore; 6. Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design Thomas R. Palfrey; Implementation theory: discussion Mathias Dewatripont.

'[This book] is essential reading for anyone who is interested in the present state of economic theory and its likely future direction. Between them the papers cover almost all the areas of economic theory which were most active in the latter part of the 1980s (all of them still highly active today). All the papers are lucid and well presented … and in some cases … will remain for some time to come the best introduction to the subject for graduate students and other non-specialists.' Robert Evans, The Economic Journal