From the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted
when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change
within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of
congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained
this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by
members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy
motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually
interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional
change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions
have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for
members and outside observers alike. Analyzing leadership, committee,
and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932,
1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting
a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and
Senate. He shows that multiple interests determine institutional
innovation within a period; that different interests are important in
different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient
collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or
developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed,
as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to
serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of
Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of
"disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with
historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and
advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more
nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of
American political development and history.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781400824250
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Vendor
Princeton University Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter