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Epistemic Value

Haddock Adrian Millar, Alan Pritchard Duncan
Innbundet / 2009 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199231188
Publisert
2009
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
724 gr
Høyde
241 mm
Bredde
163 mm
Dybde
27 mm
Aldersnivå
UU, UP, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
370

Redaktør
Haddock Adrian
Millar, Alan
Pritchard Duncan

Biographical note

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

Epistemic Value

Haddock Adrian Millar, Alan Pritchard Duncan
Innbundet / 2009 / Engelsk
Haddock Adrian Millar, Alan Pritchard Duncan
Innbundet / 2009 / Engelsk
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Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.
Les mer
Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?
Les mer
Introduction ; PART ONE: THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE ; 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge ; 2. Is There a Value Problem? ; 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge ; 4. The Value of Understanding ; 5. Ugly Analyses and Value ; 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing ; 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge ; 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value ; 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control ; PART TWO: TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL ; 10. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values ; 11. Epistemic Normativity ; 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth ; 13. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth ; APPENDIX: SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG'S THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING ; 14. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding ; 15. The Value Problem ; 16. Is Understanding Factive? ; 17. Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno Requirement ; 18. Responses to Critics
Les mer
This impressive collection of essays exhibits the recent âvalue turnâ in epistemology.
Specially written essays on a hot topic in epistemology. Engages with a wide range of current literature Eminent team of contributors
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Les mer
Specially written essays on a hot topic in epistemology. Engages with a wide range of current literature Eminent team of contributors

Relaterte produkter

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.
Les mer
Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?
Les mer
Introduction ; PART ONE: THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE ; 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge ; 2. Is There a Value Problem? ; 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge ; 4. The Value of Understanding ; 5. Ugly Analyses and Value ; 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing ; 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge ; 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value ; 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control ; PART TWO: TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL ; 10. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values ; 11. Epistemic Normativity ; 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth ; 13. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth ; APPENDIX: SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG'S THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING ; 14. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding ; 15. The Value Problem ; 16. Is Understanding Factive? ; 17. Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno Requirement ; 18. Responses to Critics
Les mer
This impressive collection of essays exhibits the recent âvalue turnâ in epistemology.
Specially written essays on a hot topic in epistemology. Engages with a wide range of current literature Eminent team of contributors
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Les mer
Specially written essays on a hot topic in epistemology. Engages with a wide range of current literature Eminent team of contributors

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199231188
Publisert
2009
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
724 gr
Høyde
241 mm
Bredde
163 mm
Dybde
27 mm
Aldersnivå
UU, UP, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
370

Redaktør
Haddock Adrian
Millar, Alan
Pritchard Duncan

Biographical note

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

Relaterte produkter