1. High court-elected branch institutions in Latin America; 2. Setting the scene: Latin America's triple transition and the judicialization of economic governance; 3. Politicization and the political court in Argentina; 4. Professionalism and the statesman court in Brazil; 5. The political court and high court submission and inter-branch confrontation in Argentina; 6. The statesman court and inter-branch accommodation in Brazil; 7. Conclusions and implications.

'This is a wonderful book - meticulously crafted, with close attention to methods and concept formation, presenting a nuanced and persuasive argument. Kapiszewski's analysis places the strategic calculus of courts within their historical and institutional contexts, ultimately producing an account that feels more true to the way judges actually decide and the way politicians interact with their courts. Her argument incorporates what is unique about courts as legal institutions, while remaining fully political in its analysis. An excellent addition to the burgeoning comparative judicial politics literature.' Daniel M. Brinks, University of Texas, Austin'A fascinating, methodologically astute, and theoretically sophisticated book. Kapiszewski's comparative account of high court-elected branch interaction in Brazil and Argentina provides a textbook illustration of how quality political science scholarship is essential to our understanding of law and courts.' Ran Hirschl, University of Toronto'Empirically rich and theoretically generative, this study marks a significant advance for the literature on comparative judicial politics. By contrasting patterns over time in two important cases, Kapiszewski gives us a new framework for thinking about judicial interaction with political branches. A major achievement.' Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago'High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil is an important empirical and theoretical contribution to the burgeoning literature on judicial politics in Latin America and to the broader literature on historical institutionalism. Diana Kapiszewski shows that high courts developed identifiable, relatively stable characters that help explain the pattern of interactions between courts and elected officials. By emphasizing court character, she challenges accounts that focus exclusively on judges' or politicians' short-term strategic incentives. Kapiszewski also skilfully analyzes the origins of the differences in court character in Argentina and Brazil.' Scott Mainwaring, Eugene and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame