How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in
countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can
firms from advanced market economies do business in such
circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines
the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak
economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through
much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships,
arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to
impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up
in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries
with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the
shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations
have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks
of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs
a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new
conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our
understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with
each other and with the government's law. For example, one model
explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates
problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies
grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit
enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why
state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with
others. This can help less-developed countries and transition
economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of
their formal legal systems.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781400841370
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Vendor
Princeton University Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter