Sometimes politicians run for office promising one set of policies,
and if they win, switch to very different ones. Latin American
presidents in recent years have frequently run promising to avoid
pro-market reforms and harsh economic adjustment, then win and
transform immediately into enthusiastic market reformers. Does it
matter when politicians ignore the promises they made and the
preferences of their constituents? If politicians want to be reelected
or see their party reelected at the end of their term, why would they
impose unpopular policies? Susan Stokes develops a model of policy
switches and tests it with statistical and qualitative data from Latin
American elections over the last two decades. She concludes that
politicians may change policies because unpopular policies are best
for constituents and best serve their own political ambitions.
Nevertheless, even though good representatives sometimes switch
policies, abrupt change tends to erode the quality of democracy.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780511032301
Publisert
2013
Utgave
1. utgave
Utgiver
Vendor
Cambridge University Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter