In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking – the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking.Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.
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This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer defends an account of 'triple-process' moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are insufficiently understood when described in terms of a twin-track quick but intuitive and slow but rational type of cognition.
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Introduction 1. Dual Process Theory 2. From Dual to Triple Process Theory 3. A Triple Process Theory of Moral Cognition. Index
"Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty." - S. A. Mason, CHOICE

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780367733469
Publisert
2020-12-18
Utgiver
Vendor
Routledge
Vekt
217 gr
Høyde
216 mm
Bredde
138 mm
Aldersnivå
U, 05
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Antall sider
118

Forfatter

Biographical note

Hanno Sauer is an Assistant Professor of Ethics at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies and a member of the Ethics Institute at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. He is the author of Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions (2017) and Debunking Arguments in Ethics (2018).