Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics: A Series of
Monographs and Textbooks: Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of
Perfect Competition focuses on the application of noncooperative
approaches to the theory of perfect competition, including Cournot
game, no-surplus condition, and Nash equilibria. The selection first
elaborates on collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria
of oligopolies with long but finite lives and noncooperative price
taking in large dynamic markets. Discussions focus on noncooperative
equilibria which support the monopoly allocation, alternative
definition of perfect epsilon-equilibrium, one-period Cournot game,
fixed-demand case, and replication case. The book takes a look at
noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets, no-surplus
condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium,
perfect competition, profit criterion, and the organization of
economic activity. Topics include profits to individually improving
welfare, structure of firms, competitive allocations as no surplus
allocations, profits as rents, Walrasian and perfectly competitive
equilibrium, and no-surplus and core equivalence as alternative
characterizations of perfectly competitive equilibrium. The manuscript
ponders on Nash equilibria of market games and efficiency properties
of strategic market games, as well as commodities, agents,
assignments, strategic markets games, proper and full Cournot-Nash
equilibria, and finiteness and inefficiency. The selection is a
valuable source of data for researchers interested in noncooperative
approaches to the theory of perfect competition.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781483271606
Publisert
2016
Utgiver
Vendor
Academic Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter