When the United States invaded Afghanistan after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, and then overthrew the Taliban regime, senior
military officers were not predicting that the United States would be
militarily involved 18 years later. Yet, after expending nearly $800
billion and suffering over 2,400 killed, the United States is still
there, having achieved at best a stalemate. This CSIS report concludes
that the mission in Afghanistan expanded from a limited focus on
counterterrorism to a broad nation-building effort without discussions
about the implications for the duration and intensity of the military
campaign. This expansion occurred without considering the history of
Afghanistan, the Soviet experience, and the decades-long effort
required in successful nation-building efforts. The report makes a
series of recommendations: improving the dialogue between senior
military and civilian officials about desired goals/end states and the
implied intensity/duration of a military campaign; continuing the
development of military strategists; revising military doctrine
publications to include discussion of choices about goals/end states;
and taking more seriously the history and experience of others.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781442281264
Publisert
2019
Utgiver
Vendor
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter