However, all readers, regardless of their mathematical sophistication or methodological predilections, will find a large number of the papers interesting and worthwhile in giving an overview of the present state of welfare economics and providing guides to the literature specialities of particular interest.

Contents: Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction William J. Baumol and Charles A. Wilson PART I THE CRITERIA A Pareto Criterion and Compensation Principles 1. T. De Scitovszky (1941), ‘A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics’ 2. Paul A. Samuelson (1950), ‘Evaluation of Real National Income’ 3. Vilfredo Pareto (1971), ‘Maximum Ophelimity’ B Compensation and its Shortcomings 4. Nicholas Kaldor (1939), ‘Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility’ 5. J.R. Hicks (1940), ‘The Valuation of Social Income’ 6. W.M. Gorman (1955), ‘The Intransitivity of Certain Criteria Used in Welfare Economics’ 7. John S. Chipman and James C. Moore (1973), ‘Aggregate Demand, Real National Income, and the Compensation Principle’ PART II FOUNDATIONS A General Treatment 8. Arnold C. Harberger (1971), ‘Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay’ 9. Martin S. Feldstein (1972), ‘Distributional Equity and the Optimal Structure of Public Prices’ 10. Robin W. Boadway (1974), ‘The Welfare Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis’ B Tools for Welfare Measurement: Single Consumer and Producer 11. J.R. Hicks (1943), ‘The Four Consumer’s Surpluses’ 12. E.J. Mishan (1959), ‘Communications: Rent as a Measure of Welfare Change’ 13. Robert D. Willig (1976), ‘Consumer’s Surplus Without Apology’ 14. Ezra J. Mishan (1977), ‘The Plain Truth About Consumer Surplus’ 15. Alan Randall and John R. Stoll (1980), ‘Consumer’s Surplus in Commodity Space’ PART III MANY-CONSUMER ECONOMIES A Aggregation of Welfare 16. Lord Robbins (1984), ‘Richard T. Ely Lecture: Economics and Political Economy’ and ‘The Significance of Economic Science’ 17. Abram Burk (1938), ‘A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics’ 18. Paul A. Samuelson (1956), ‘Social Indifference Curves’ B Does Addition of Consumers’ and Producers’ Surpluses Add Up? 19. James E. Anderson (1974), ‘A Note on Welfare Surpluses and Gains From Trade in General Equilibrium’ 20. Richard Schmalensee (1976), ‘Another Look at the Social Valuation of Input Price Changes’ 21. Richard E. Just and Darrell L. Hueth (1979), ‘Welfare Measures in a Multimarket Framework’ 22. Neil Bruce and Richard G. Harris (1982), ‘Cost–Benefit Criteria and the Compensation Principle in Evaluating Small Projects’ PART IV CHOICE BETWEEN MARKET AND NON-MARKET ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 23. Clive Bull and Janusz A. Ordover (1987), ‘Market Structure and Optimal Management Organizations’ 24. R.H. Coase (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’ 25. Kenneth J. Arrow (1970), ‘The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation’ 26. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), ‘The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies’ 27. Oskar Lange (1936-1937), ‘On the Economic Theory of Socialism’ 28. A.P. Lerner (1936-1937), ‘A Note on Socialist Economics’ PART V SECOND BEST ANALYSIS 30. Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster (1997), ‘The General Theory of Second Best’ 31. Otto A. Davis and Andrew B. Whinston (1965), ‘Welfare Economics and the Theory of Second Best’ 32. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1996), ‘Creating Competition Through Interconnection: Theory and Practice’ Name Index Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction and Preface by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I PART I VIRTUES OF THE MARKET MECHANISM 1. Vilfredo Pareto (1972), excerpt from Manual of Political Economy 2. E. Barone (1935), ‘The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State’ 3. A.C. Pigou, M.A. (1952), ‘Rates of Return and the Values of Marginal Private Net Products’ PART II PERFECT COMPETITION: THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREMS OF WELFARE ECONOMICS A Basic Analysis and Results 4. Oscar Lange (1942), ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’ 5. Kenneth J. Arrow (1951), ‘An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics’ 6. Tjalling C. Koopmans (1957), ‘Allocation of Resources and the Price System’ 7. Gerard Debreu (1959/1987), ‘Optimum’ B Application to Intertemporal Setting 8. Paul A. Samuelson (1958), ‘An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or Without the Social Contrivance of Money’ 9. David Cass (1972), ‘On Capital Overaccumulation in the Aggregative, Neoclassical Model of Economic Growth: A Complete Characterization’ 10. K.J. Arrow (1964), ‘The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing’ 11. Oliver D. Hart (1975), ‘On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete’ 12. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1982), ‘The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium’ 13. John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis (1986), ‘Existence, Regularity, and Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations when the Asset Market is Incomplete’ PART III PUBLIC GOODS, EXTERNALITIES AND SCALE ECONOMIES A The Broad Issues 14. Francis M. Bator (1958), ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’ B Externalities, Scale Economies and Nonconvexities 16. A.C. Pigou, M.A. (1912), ‘Hindrances to Equality of Marginal Net Products Due to Divergence Between Marginal Social Net Product and Marginal Private Net Product’ 17. Alfred Marshall (1920), excerpt from ‘Industrial Organization, Continued. Division of Labour. The Influence of Machinery’ and ‘Limitations of the Use of Statical Assumptions in Regard to Increasing Return’ 18. J.H. Clapham (1922), ‘Of Empty Economic Boxes’ 19. Donald J. Brown and Geoffrey Heal (1979), ‘Equity, Efficiency and Increasing Returns’ 20. William J. Baumol (1979), ‘Quasi Optimality: The Price We Must Pay for a Price System’ PART IV MONOPOLY AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION A General 21. A.C. Pigou, M.A. (1952), ‘Simple Monopoly’ and ‘Discriminating Monopoly’ 22. Joan Robinson (1972), ‘Comparisons of Monopoly and Competitive Output’ 23. Edward Chamberlin (1938), ‘Pure and Monopolistic Competition Compared’ 24. Michael Spence (1976), ‘Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition’ B Social Costs of Monopoly 25. Arnold C. Harberger (1954), ‘Monopoly and Resource Allocation’ 26. Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’ 27. Gordon Tullock (1980), ‘Efficient Rent Seeking’ 28. Franklin M. Fisher (1985), ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered’ PART V ASYMMETRIC AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION 29. George A. Akerlof (1970), ‘The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ 30. Mark V. Pauly (1974), ‘Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection’ 31. Charles A. Wilson (1979), ‘Equilibrium and Adverse Selection’ 32. Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz (1990), ‘The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard’ PART VI UNCERTAINTY 33. Frederick V. Waugh (1944), ‘Does the Consumer Benefit from Price Instability?’ 34. Walter Y. Oi (1961), ‘The Desirability of Price Instability Under Perfect Competition’ 35. Paul A. Samuelson (1972), ‘The Consumer Does Benefit From Feasible Price Stability’ 36. Stephen J. Turnovsky, Haim Shalit and Andrew Schmitz (1980), ‘Consumer’s Surplus, Price Instability, and Consumer Welfare’ Name Index Volume III Acknowledgements An introduction and preface by the editors to all three volumes appears in volume I PART I EXTERNALITIES AND PIGOUVIAN TAXATION 1. A.C. Pigou, M.A. (1952), excerpt from ‘Divergences Between Marginal Social Net Product and Marginal Private Net Product’ 2. J.E. Meade (1952), ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in Competitive Situation’ 3. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 4. James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine (1962), ‘Externality’ 5. William J. Baumol (1972), ‘On Taxation and the Control of Externalities’ 6. Martin L. Weitzman (1974), ‘Prices vs. Quantities’ 7. J.A. Ordover and R.D. Willig (1979), ‘The Role of Information in Designing Social Policy Towards Externalities’ 8. Dennis W. Carlton and Glenn C. Loury (1980), ‘The Limitations of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run Remedy for Externalities’ PART II RAMSEY PRICING 9. F.P. Ramsey (1927), ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation’ 10. M. Boiteux (1971), ‘On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to Budgetary Constraints’ 11. William J. Baumol and David F. Bradford (1970), ‘Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing’ 12. Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971), ‘Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency’ 13. Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971), ‘Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules’ PART III PREDATORY PRICING 14. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’ 15. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’ 16. William J. Baumol (1996), ‘Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test’ PART IV REGULATION OF PRICES A Traditional Regulation 17. Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson (1962), ‘Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint’ 18. Alfred E. Kahn (1989), ‘The Traditional Issues in the Pricing of Public Utility Services’ B Efficient Regulation, Stand-alone Cost Ceilings, and Price Caps 19. Harold Demsetz (1968), ‘Why Regulate Utilities?’ 20. Ingo Vogelsang and Jörg Finsinger (1979), ‘A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms’ 21. William J. Baumol (1982), ‘Productivity Incentive Clauses and Rate Adjustment for Inflation’ 22. Stephen C. Littlechild (1983), Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability 23. William J. Baumol and Robert D. Willig (1986), ‘Contestability: Developments Since the Book’ 24. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1990), ‘The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms – Part I: Theory’ and ‘The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms – Part II: Applications to Competitive Environments and Policy Analysis’ C Pricing of Bottleneck Inputs 25. Robert D. Willig (1979), ‘The Theory of Network Access Pricing’ 26. William J. Baumol (1999), ‘Having Your Cake: How to Preserve Universal-Service Cross Subsidies While Facilitating Competitive Entry’ Name Index