It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics.
Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. The authors indicate substantial real-world applications, and exercises for students (with solutions) are provided at the end of each chapter.
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This is an updated graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The exercises that test students' understanding are extended for each chapter.
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1. Introduction ; 2. The Base Model ; 3. The Moral Hazard Problem ; 4. The Adverse Selection Problem ; 5. Signalling ; Mathematical Appendix ; Additional Exercises
Review of the previous edition:
`It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics.'
Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University
Fully revised edition including additional exercises
Fully revised edition including additional exercises
Product details
ISBN
9780199243259
Published
2001
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Weight
473 gr
Height
234 mm
Width
156 mm
Thickness
17 mm
Age
P, 06
Language
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Number of pages
302
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