Game Theory

Innbundet / 1991 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN13
9780262061414
Publisert
1991
Utgiver
Vendor
MIT Press
Aldersnivå
05, 06, UU, UP, P
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Sider
604
Vekt
1361 gr
Høyde
254 mm
Bredde
178 mm
Tykkelse
41 mm
Se alle

Game Theory

Innbundet / 1991 / Engelsk
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory-including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information-in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
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This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.
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Part 1 Static games of complete information: games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium; iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium. Part 2 Dynamic games of complete information: extensive-form games; applications of multi-stage games with observed actions; repeated games. Part 3 Static games of incomplete information: Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium; Bayesian games and mechanism design. Part 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information: equilibrium refinements - perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection; reputation effects; sequential bargaining under incomplete information. Part 5 Advanced topics: more equilibrium refinements - stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance; advanced topics in strategic-form games; payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium; common knowledge and games.
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"Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be." Charles Wilson , Professor of Economics, New York University
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Game Theory by Fudenberg and Tirole provides a comprehensive and precise exposition of the theory and the main applied topics, plus challenging exercises conveying the key ideas from a wide literature. The treatments of dynamics and incomplete information unify developments of the 1980s. This book will be a standard text and reference. -- Robert Wilson, Professor, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Both broad and deep, this book belongs on the shelf of every serious student of game theory. -- David Kreps, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Game Theory is the book to read if you want to be published in Econometrica. -- Ken Binmore, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan and University College London Fudenberg and Tirole's text will have an immediate and important impact on the way game theory is taught at the graduate level. Not only does it cover most of the central topics in noncooperative game theory, it is as up-to-date and complete as a book in this area could hope to be. -- Charles Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University
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Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT. Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN13
9780262061414
Publisert
1991
Utgiver
Vendor
MIT Press
Aldersnivå
05, 06, UU, UP, P
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Sider
604
Vekt
1361 gr
Høyde
254 mm
Bredde
178 mm
Tykkelse
41 mm
Se alle

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