Contents:
Acknowledgements
General Introduction Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn
PART I JAMES A. MIRRLEES
Introduction to Part I: James A. Mirrlees (b. 1936)
1. J.A. Mirrlees (1971), âAn Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxationâ
2. Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971a), âOptimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiencyâ
3. Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees (1971b), âOptimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rulesâ
4. J.A. Mirrlees (1974), âNotes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertaintyâ
5. James A. Mirrlees (1976), âThe Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organizationâ
6. James A. Mirrlees (1997), âInformation and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticksâ
PART II WILLIAM S. VICKREY
Introduction to Part II: William S. Vickrey (1914-96)
7. William Vickrey (1939), âAveraging of Income for Income-Tax Purposesâ
8. William Vickrey (1945), âMeasuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Riskâ
9. William S. Vickrey (1955), âA Proposal for Revising New Yorkâs Subway Fare Structureâ
10. William Vickrey (1961), âCounterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tendersâ
11. William S. Vickrey (1962), âAuction and Bidding Gamesâ
12. William Vickrey (1992), âFederal Tax Policy for the 1990âs: An Updated Agenda for Progressive Taxationâ
PART III GEORGE A. AKERLOF
Introduction to Part III: George A. Akerlof (b. 1940)
13. George A. Akerlof (1970), âThe Market for âLemonsâ: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanismâ
14. George Akerlof (1976), âThe Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Talesâ
15. George A. Akerlof (1980), âA Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequenceâ
16. George A. Akerlof (1982), âLabor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchangeâ
17. George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen (1985), âA Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertiaâ
18. George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen (1990), âThe Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemploymentâ
PART IV A. MICHAEL SPENCE
Introduction to Part IV: A. Michael Spence (b.1943)
19. Michael Spence (1973), âJob Market Signalingâ
20. Michael Spence (1974), âCompetitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of Efficiency and Distributionâ
21. Michael Spence (1976), âProduct Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competitionâ
22. A. Michael Spence (1977), âEntry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricingâ
23. Michael Spence (1984), âCost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performanceâ
24. Michael Spence (2002), âSignaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Marketsâ
PART V JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
Introduction to Part V: Joseph E. Stiglitz (b. 1943)
25. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1974), âIncentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecroppingâ
26. Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz (1976), âEquilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Informationâ
27. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), âOn the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Marketsâ
28. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981), âCredit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informationâ
29. Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984), âEquilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Deviceâ
30. Bruce C. Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986), âExternalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Marketsâ
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