First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.
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  1. Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
    DEMOCRACY
  2. Interest Groups and Collective Action
  3. Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
  4. Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
  5. Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
    BUREAUCRACY
  6. Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
  7. The Bureau-Shaping Model
  8. Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
  9. Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9781138146631
Publisert
2016-05-11
Utgiver
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Vekt
453 gr
Høyde
234 mm
Bredde
156 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
300

Forfatter

Biografisk notat

Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)