Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in
distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win
elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off,
but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do
parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can
count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote
buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies
but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This
book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these
questions, testing the theory with research from four developing
democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in
all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate
whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic
distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they
promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9781316143339
Publisert
2014
Utgave
1. utgave
Utgiver
Vendor
Cambridge University Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok