The predominant notion of subjectivity today is the Habermasian project of the mutual recognition of free responsible agents. What disappears in this project is the antagonistic core of subjectivity, a traumatic disturbance inscribed into the very notion of subject from Kant to Hegel. With reference to Lacan, Finkelde forcefully brings back this obliterated dimension: the true meaning of "excessive subjectivity" is that subjectivity is as such an excess. Excessive Subjectivity is not just an important contribution to the topic of subjectivity, it does much more: it redefines the entire field. In short, it is an instant classic. -- Slavoj ZZizek, University of Ljubljana and New York University Excessive Subjectivity is a compellingly engaging book dealing with a very topical issue, namely the need to address, think and reconfigure the concept of subjectivity today. Dominik Finkelde does so through a most original bringing together of Kant and Hegel, staging the discussion in terms of both classical and very contemporary problems of philosophy, politics, and ethics. This book was greatly needed! -- Alenka Zupancic, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts Finkelde's is an impressive and precise investigation into subjectivity as a distorting factor in any account of how things really are. Ontology as our inquiry into what there is affects what there is in that subjectivity always goes beyond itself. Finkelde's lucid reconstruction of difficult figures like Hegel or Lacan as well as his take on their relationship to Kant shows that subjectivity is a feature of reality and not just a hallmark of the conscious mind. He thereby successfully undermines a problematic cornerstone assumption of contemporary philosophy of mind. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the figures discussed in this book or the topic of subjectivity. -- Markus Gabriel, Director of the International Center for Philosophy, University of Bonn, Germany Finkelde incisively interrogates Kant's, Hegel's, and Lacan's theories of subjectivity to produce a timely account of the structure of the "excessive" subject: the subject, that is, that is able to break with the established order through its exceptional self-constituting act, thereby producing fundamentally new possibilities for ethical life. Far-ranging and trenchant, this work develops new connections within established theories of subjectivity and offers in its own right a radical new theory of action, practice, and transformation. It will be sought out by all those interested in how the classical and contemporary theory of the subject bears on the broadest problems of thought and action today. -- Paul Livingston, University of New Mexico