Moral Realism: A Defense is highly accessible, and Shafer-Landau does a remarkable job of navigating difficult arguments in the domain of meta-ethics and of metaphysics and epistemology. It is an excellent text to include in upper-level undergraduate courses in meta-ethics as well as in graduate seminars.

'Analytical metaethics is an area where a great deal of ingenuity is currently required in order to find a distinctive yet plausible position to defend at any length. In this book, Russ Shafer-Landau demonstrates that the task remains possible. Over 300 pages or so, he defends an unorthodox combination of claims, including anti-Humeanism about reasons for action, mind-independent moral realism, moral non-naturalism, moral rationalism, and reliabilist moral epistemology. Shafer-Landaus book will be useful to any student of philosophy who wants to gain a synoptic view of contemporary metaethics, and also to professionals with a stake in the many ongoing debates to which the book makes valuable contributions.'

Hallvard Lillehammer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

A book of remarkable scope and ambition . . . clear and engaging throughout . . . [Shafer-Landau] develops a number of novel arguments for what is sure to be a controversial set of mutually supporting and philosophically interesting positions. . . . very much worth reading. It is also accessible and engaging enough to be useful for teaching advanced undergraduates.

Michael Ridge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.
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Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS ; II. MORAL METAPHYSICS ; III. MORAL MOTIVATION ; IV. MORAL REASONS ; V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
`Analytical metaethics is an area where a great deal of ingenuity is currently required in order to find a distinctive yet plausible position to defend at any length. In this book, Russ Shafer-Landau demonstrates that the task remains possible. Over 300 pages or so, he defends an unorthodox combination of claims, including anti-Humeanism about reasons for action, mind-independent moral realism, moral non-naturalism, moral rationalism, and reliabilist moral epistemology. Shafer-Landau's book will be useful to any student of philosophy who wants to gain a synoptic view of contemporary metaethics, and also to professionals with a stake in the many ongoing debates to which the book makes valuable contributions. . . . among the most comprehensive, judicious, and well written to appear in recent years.' Hallvard Lillehammer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Les mer
A powerful defence of the reality of morality Challenges all other current moral theories Presents highly original views on moral motivation, practical reason, and moral epistemology Ideal as an introduction to metaethics for graduate students and advanced undergraduates
Les mer
A powerful defence of the reality of morality Challenges all other current moral theories Presents highly original views on moral motivation, practical reason, and moral epistemology Ideal as an introduction to metaethics for graduate students and advanced undergraduates
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199259755
Publisert
2003
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
640 gr
Høyde
242 mm
Bredde
163 mm
Dybde
24 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
332

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