The essays are of a consistently high quality, carefully and closely argued. They typically either propose a new problem for some metaethical theory (usually expressivism or some form of realism) or address and try to resolve a specific problem or issue for a metaethical theory ... This book will be very useful to scholars who work in metaethics and are interested in keeping current with advances and discussions in that field.

M. A. Michael, CHOICE

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. Topics explored in Volume 16 include moral worth, moral testimony, moral evaluation, expressivism, reasons, and normativity.
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Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.
Les mer
1: Nadeem J.Z. Hussain: The Ontic Cosmic Coincidence Problem for Non-Naturalism about Morality 2: Sarah McGrath: Expressivism about Gender 3: Derek Baker: If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing 4: Luca Incurvati and Julian J. Schlöder: Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem 5: Christine Tiefensee: Metasemantics for the Relaxed 6: Justin Snedegar: Reasons, Competition, and Latitude 7: Nathan Robert Howard: The Goals of Moral Worth 8: Daniel Wodak: Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony 9: Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett: Evaluation Turned in on Itself: The Vindicatory Circularity Challenge to the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity 10: Vilma Venesmaa: Explaining our Knowledge of Normative Supervenience 11: Gideon Rosen: The Modal Status of Moral Principles
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The sixteenth volume in an annual series The latest and most exciting research in one of philosophy's hottest fields Features important new work by big names in the field Edited by an internationally respected ethicist
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Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (OUP 2009).
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The sixteenth volume in an annual series The latest and most exciting research in one of philosophy's hottest fields Features important new work by big names in the field Edited by an internationally respected ethicist
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780192897466
Publisert
2021
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
474 gr
Høyde
222 mm
Bredde
142 mm
Dybde
21 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
306

Redaktør

Biografisk notat

Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (OUP 2009).