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Vagueness and Contradiction

Sorensen Roy
Innbundet / 2001 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199241309
Publisert
2001
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
401 gr
Høyde
224 mm
Bredde
146 mm
Dybde
16 mm
Aldersnivå
G, 01
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
208

Forfatter
Sorensen Roy

Biografisk notat

Roy Sorensen is Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. Before joining Dartmouth philosophy department in 1999 he taught at New York University for twelve years.

Vagueness and Contradiction

Sorensen Roy
Innbundet / 2001 / Engelsk
Sorensen Roy
Innbundet / 2001 / Engelsk
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Sorensen's book is well worth reading. His version of epistemicism is a more robust version than Williamson's, and his arguments for being rationally compelled towards inconsistency are important and interesting in themselves ... Anyone working in the philosophy of language will benefit from reading the book; and anyone working on the paradoxes must read the book. I strongly recommend the book as a central text for classes in the philosophy of language (at either the undergraduate or graduate level).

J C Beall, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? Epistemicists answer 'Yes!' They believe that any predicate that divides things divides them sharply. They solve the ancient sorites paradox by picturing vagueness as a kind of ignorance. The alternative solutions are radical. They either reject classical theorems or inference rules or reject our common sense view of what can exist. Epistemicists spare this central portion of our web of belief by challenging peripheral intuitions about the nature of language. So why is this continuation of the status quo so incredible? Why do epistemicists themselves have trouble believing their theory? In Vagueness and Contradiction Roy Sorensen traces our incredulity to linguistic norms that build upon our psychological tendencies to round off insignificant differences. These simplifying principles lead to massive inconsistency, rather like the rounding off errors of calculators with limited memory. English entitles speakers to believe each 'tolerance conditional' such as those of the form 'If n is small, then n + 1 is small.' The conjunction of these a priori beliefs entails absurd conditionals such as 'If 1 is small, then a billion is small.' Since the negation of this absurdity is an a priori truth, our a priori beliefs about small numbers are jointly inconsistent. One of the tolerance conditionals, at the threshold of smallness, must be an analytic falsehood that we are compelled to regard as a tautology. Since there are infinitely many analytic sorites arguments, Sorensen concludes that we are obliged to believe infinitely many contradictions. These contradictions are not specifically detectable. They are ineliminable, like the heat from a light bulb. Although the light bulb is not designed to produce heat, the heat is inevitably produced as a side-effect of illumination. Vagueness can be avoided by representational systems that make no concession to limits of perception, or memory, or testimony. But quick and rugged representational systems, such as natural languages, will trade 'rationality' for speed and flexibility. Roy Sorensen defends epistemicism in his own distinctive style, inventive and amusing. But he has some serious things to say about language and logic, about the way the world is and about our understanding of it.
Les mer
This is Roy Sorensens original treatment of the ancient problem of vagueness. According to his approach, the answer to questions like 'Did Buddha become a fat man in one second?' and 'Is there a tallest short giraffe?' is yes! This title says serious things about language and logic, about the way the world is and about our understanding of it.
Les mer
Introduction ; 1. Absolute Borderline Cases ; 2. Intellectual Embarrassment without Vagueness ; 3. Forced Analytical Errors ; 4. Inconsistent Machines ; 5. Sainsbury's Spectra and the Penrose Triangle ; 6. Does Apriority Agglomerate? ; 7. Analytic Sorites and the Cheshire Cat ; 8. Believing the Impossible ; 9. Reason Demands Belief in Infinitely Many Contradictions ; 10. The Viral Theory of Inconsistency ; 11. Truthmaker Gaps ; References, Index
Les mer
`Sorensen's book is well worth reading. His version of epistemicism is a more robust version than Williamson's, and his arguments for being rationally compelled towards inconsistency are important and interesting in themselves ... Anyone working in the philosophy of language will benefit from reading the book; and anyone working on the paradoxes must read the book. I strongly recommend the book as a central text for classes in the philosophy of language (at either the undergraduate or graduate level).' J C Beall, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews `Review from other book by this author stimulating ... written in a vivid jaunty style ... The array of philosophical positions and teh many examples are presented with such clarity and freshness ... that this book can be recommended both as an unusual but engaging introduction to philosophy and as a sensitive analysis and defence of the cognitive power of thought experiments.' Times Higher Education Supplement `simply and clearly written, and virtually all of it is instructive and enjoyable to read.' George Schlesinger, University of North Carolina `Roy A. Sorensen's book is a useful collection of reflections on the definition and logic of thought experiments. It contains some splendid examples ... There are painstaking lists of respects in which thought experiments are, and are not, like ordinary experiments.' Simon Blackburn, Times Literary Supplement `Roy Sorensen's aim in his stimulating book is to demystify and defend the place of thought experiments in both science and philosophy ... This book is written in a vivid, jaunty style ... There is sustained argument, but also rapid movement from one case to another. The array of philosophical positions and the many examples are presented with such clarity and freshness, however, that this book can be recommended both as an unusual but engaging introduction to philosophy and as a sensitive analysis and defence of the cognitive power of thought experiments.' Times Higher Education Supplement `The book is tightly reasoned, and written in an engaging, often jocular style, Sorensen advances and defends his model in the manner of someone sincerely and pragmatically seeking comprehension, and is never didactic or ponderous.' James W. McAllister, University of Leiden, Mind, Vol. 102, No. 408, Oct '93 `The first full-scale treatment of thought experiments ... The book is clearly written and largely nontechnical. It bears on the nature of theorizing in general, owing to its careful treatment of a wide range of cases of theoretical activity. Recommended for all libraries.' Choice `[An] important new book ... Sorensen articulates what is sure to become one of the central views about thought experiments, but he also provides an excellent introduction to this wonderful subject. The topic has rather suddenly become a growth industry. Besides its other virtues, Roy Sorensen's Thought Experiments also offers a very good leg in.' Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Les mer
concentrates on the idea that language forces even competent speakers into inconsistency written in a lively, informal way 'vagueness' is one of the most discussed areas of philosophy of language everyone interested in this area will want to read this book
Les mer
Roy Sorensen is Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. Before joining Dartmouth philosophy department in 1999 he taught at New York University for twelve years.
concentrates on the idea that language forces even competent speakers into inconsistency written in a lively, informal way 'vagueness' is one of the most discussed areas of philosophy of language everyone interested in this area will want to read this book
Les mer

Relaterte produkter

Sorensen's book is well worth reading. His version of epistemicism is a more robust version than Williamson's, and his arguments for being rationally compelled towards inconsistency are important and interesting in themselves ... Anyone working in the philosophy of language will benefit from reading the book; and anyone working on the paradoxes must read the book. I strongly recommend the book as a central text for classes in the philosophy of language (at either the undergraduate or graduate level).

J C Beall, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? Epistemicists answer 'Yes!' They believe that any predicate that divides things divides them sharply. They solve the ancient sorites paradox by picturing vagueness as a kind of ignorance. The alternative solutions are radical. They either reject classical theorems or inference rules or reject our common sense view of what can exist. Epistemicists spare this central portion of our web of belief by challenging peripheral intuitions about the nature of language. So why is this continuation of the status quo so incredible? Why do epistemicists themselves have trouble believing their theory? In Vagueness and Contradiction Roy Sorensen traces our incredulity to linguistic norms that build upon our psychological tendencies to round off insignificant differences. These simplifying principles lead to massive inconsistency, rather like the rounding off errors of calculators with limited memory. English entitles speakers to believe each 'tolerance conditional' such as those of the form 'If n is small, then n + 1 is small.' The conjunction of these a priori beliefs entails absurd conditionals such as 'If 1 is small, then a billion is small.' Since the negation of this absurdity is an a priori truth, our a priori beliefs about small numbers are jointly inconsistent. One of the tolerance conditionals, at the threshold of smallness, must be an analytic falsehood that we are compelled to regard as a tautology. Since there are infinitely many analytic sorites arguments, Sorensen concludes that we are obliged to believe infinitely many contradictions. These contradictions are not specifically detectable. They are ineliminable, like the heat from a light bulb. Although the light bulb is not designed to produce heat, the heat is inevitably produced as a side-effect of illumination. Vagueness can be avoided by representational systems that make no concession to limits of perception, or memory, or testimony. But quick and rugged representational systems, such as natural languages, will trade 'rationality' for speed and flexibility. Roy Sorensen defends epistemicism in his own distinctive style, inventive and amusing. But he has some serious things to say about language and logic, about the way the world is and about our understanding of it.
Les mer
This is Roy Sorensens original treatment of the ancient problem of vagueness. According to his approach, the answer to questions like 'Did Buddha become a fat man in one second?' and 'Is there a tallest short giraffe?' is yes! This title says serious things about language and logic, about the way the world is and about our understanding of it.
Les mer
Introduction ; 1. Absolute Borderline Cases ; 2. Intellectual Embarrassment without Vagueness ; 3. Forced Analytical Errors ; 4. Inconsistent Machines ; 5. Sainsbury's Spectra and the Penrose Triangle ; 6. Does Apriority Agglomerate? ; 7. Analytic Sorites and the Cheshire Cat ; 8. Believing the Impossible ; 9. Reason Demands Belief in Infinitely Many Contradictions ; 10. The Viral Theory of Inconsistency ; 11. Truthmaker Gaps ; References, Index
Les mer
`Sorensen's book is well worth reading. His version of epistemicism is a more robust version than Williamson's, and his arguments for being rationally compelled towards inconsistency are important and interesting in themselves ... Anyone working in the philosophy of language will benefit from reading the book; and anyone working on the paradoxes must read the book. I strongly recommend the book as a central text for classes in the philosophy of language (at either the undergraduate or graduate level).' J C Beall, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews `Review from other book by this author stimulating ... written in a vivid jaunty style ... The array of philosophical positions and teh many examples are presented with such clarity and freshness ... that this book can be recommended both as an unusual but engaging introduction to philosophy and as a sensitive analysis and defence of the cognitive power of thought experiments.' Times Higher Education Supplement `simply and clearly written, and virtually all of it is instructive and enjoyable to read.' George Schlesinger, University of North Carolina `Roy A. Sorensen's book is a useful collection of reflections on the definition and logic of thought experiments. It contains some splendid examples ... There are painstaking lists of respects in which thought experiments are, and are not, like ordinary experiments.' Simon Blackburn, Times Literary Supplement `Roy Sorensen's aim in his stimulating book is to demystify and defend the place of thought experiments in both science and philosophy ... This book is written in a vivid, jaunty style ... There is sustained argument, but also rapid movement from one case to another. The array of philosophical positions and the many examples are presented with such clarity and freshness, however, that this book can be recommended both as an unusual but engaging introduction to philosophy and as a sensitive analysis and defence of the cognitive power of thought experiments.' Times Higher Education Supplement `The book is tightly reasoned, and written in an engaging, often jocular style, Sorensen advances and defends his model in the manner of someone sincerely and pragmatically seeking comprehension, and is never didactic or ponderous.' James W. McAllister, University of Leiden, Mind, Vol. 102, No. 408, Oct '93 `The first full-scale treatment of thought experiments ... The book is clearly written and largely nontechnical. It bears on the nature of theorizing in general, owing to its careful treatment of a wide range of cases of theoretical activity. Recommended for all libraries.' Choice `[An] important new book ... Sorensen articulates what is sure to become one of the central views about thought experiments, but he also provides an excellent introduction to this wonderful subject. The topic has rather suddenly become a growth industry. Besides its other virtues, Roy Sorensen's Thought Experiments also offers a very good leg in.' Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Les mer
concentrates on the idea that language forces even competent speakers into inconsistency written in a lively, informal way 'vagueness' is one of the most discussed areas of philosophy of language everyone interested in this area will want to read this book
Les mer
Roy Sorensen is Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. Before joining Dartmouth philosophy department in 1999 he taught at New York University for twelve years.
concentrates on the idea that language forces even competent speakers into inconsistency written in a lively, informal way 'vagueness' is one of the most discussed areas of philosophy of language everyone interested in this area will want to read this book
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199241309
Publisert
2001
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
401 gr
Høyde
224 mm
Bredde
146 mm
Dybde
16 mm
Aldersnivå
G, 01
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
208

Forfatter
Sorensen Roy

Biografisk notat

Roy Sorensen is Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College. Before joining Dartmouth philosophy department in 1999 he taught at New York University for twelve years.

Relaterte produkter