'Monopsony in Labor Markets is an excellent, empirically rich, and modestly technical treatment of a subject that will be especially helpful to antitrust lawyers and economists trying to sort out the effects of monopsony power on labor. The authors include full chapters on wage collusion and no poach agreements, noncompete agreements, and mergers. This book is particularly useful on questions like the extent and measurement of labor market concentration and power, tradeoffs between output and input effects, and the role of efficiencies. A must-read for an antitrust era in which harm to workers has suddenly become important.' Herbert Hovenkamp, Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School
'This volume elegantly summarizes a fast-growing literature on legal implications of labor market monopsony. Lawyers and policymakers interested in how the economic analysis of imperfect labor markets can be used in antitrust contexts will find an up-to-date, practical, and lucid exposition. Social scientists interested in how antitrust law has evolved to combat monopsony power will find a very readable and thorough overview.' Suresh Naidu, Jack Wang and Echo Ren Professor of Economics, Columbia University
'Recommended.' R. M. Whaples, CHOICE