Preface; Part I. Introduction: 1. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Part II. Representativeness: 2. Belief in the law of small numbers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; 3. Subjective probability: a judgment of representativeness Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; 4. On the psychology of presiction Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; 5. Studies of representativeness Maya Bar-Hillel; 6. Judgments of and by representativeness Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Part III. Causality and Attribution: 7. Popular induction: information is not necessarily informative Richard E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall and Harvey Reed; 8. Causal schemas in judgments under uncertainty Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; 9. Shortcomings in the attribution process: on the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments Lee Ross and Craig A. Anderson; 10. Evidential impact of base rates Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Part IV. Availability: 11. Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; 12. Egocentric biases in availability and attribution Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly; 13. The availability bias in social perception and interaction Shelley E. Taylor; 14. The simulation heuristic Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; Part V. Covariation and Control: 15. Informal covariation asssessment: data-based versus theory-based judgments Dennis L. Jennings, Teresa M. Amabile and Lee Ross; 16. The illusion of control Ellen J. Langer; 17. Test results are what you think they are Loren J. Chapman and Jean Chapman; 18. Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: problems and opportunities David M. Eddy; 19. Learning from experience and suboptimal rules in decision making Hillel J. Einhorn; Part VI. Overconfidence: 20. Overconfidence in case-study judgments Stuart Oskamp; 21. A progress report on the training of probability assessors Marc Alpert and Howard Raiffa; 22. Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980 Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff and Lawrence D. Phillips; 23. For those condemned to study the past: heuristics and biases in hindsight Baruch Fischhoff; Part VII. Multistage Evaluation: 24. Evaluation of compound probabilities in sequential choice John Cohen, E. I. Chesnick and D. Haran; 25. Conservatism in human information processing Ward Edwards; 26. The best-guess hypothesis in multistage inference Charles F. Gettys, Clinton Kelly III and Cameron R. Peterson; 27. Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory Yaacov Trope; Part VIII. Corrective Procedures: 28. The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making Robyn M. Dawes; 29. The vitality of mythical numbers Max Singer; 30. Intuitive prediction: biases and corrective procedures Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; 31. Debiasing Baruch Fischhoff; 32. Improving inductive inference Richard E. Nesbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson and Geoffrey T. Fong; Part IX. Risk Perception: 33. Facts versus fears: understanding perceived risk Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein; Part X. Postscript: 34. On the study of statistical intuitions Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; 35. Variants of uncertainty Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; References; Index.