The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
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The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.
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PART I: THE ARGUMENT FROM 'INTUITION'-TALK; PART II: THE ARGUMENT FROM PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE
a wonderfully clear, largely well-argued case against a central assumption of many contemporary metaphilosophers ... I highly recommend it. * Daniel Cohnitz, Disputatio *engaging and exciting ... Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it. * Jonathan Ichikawa, International Journal for Philosophical Studies *an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate * Stephen Ingram, Metaphilosophy *
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Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780198703020
Publisert
2014
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
308 gr
Høyde
216 mm
Bredde
142 mm
Tykkelse
14 mm
Aldersnivå
05, 06, UU, UP, P
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Antall sider
256

Forfatter

Om bidragsyterne

Herman Cappelen is a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews, where he works at the Arche Philosophical Research Centre. He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. He is the author of many papers and three books: Insensitive Semantics (with Ernest Lepore), Language Turned on Itself (with Ernest Lepore), and Relativism and Monadic Truth (with John Hawthorne).