When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are making a
value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something
superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or their evidence,
or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to
investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to
make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge
and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that
knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success.
This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By
reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued,
we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has
for us.
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A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity
Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780511730696
Publisert
2013
Utgave
1. utgave
Utgiver
Cambridge University Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter