Aristotle and Xunzi on Shame, Moral Education, and the Good Life
Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
Jingyi Jenny Zhao is ISF Academy Senior Research Fellow at the Needham Research Institute and Needham Research Fellow at Clare Hall, University of Cambridge. She holds a PhD from the Faculty of Classics at the University of Cambridge. Her research takes a cross-cultural comparative perspective on the ancient Greek and early Chinese philosophical traditions. She is co-editor and contributor of Ancient Greece and China Compared, and was interviewed for the BBC documentary Story of China.What would Aristotle and Xunzi have made of one another's ethical systems? Thanks to Jingyi Jenny Zhao, we are closer than ever to envisioning that conversation. Zhao's subtle virtuosity in multiple realms--philology, philosophy, and cultural history--equips her to do groundbreaking work in the field of what I call 'Comparative Classics.'
John Kirby, University of Miami
Jingyi Jenny Zhao has conducted a philologically sensitive, philosophically rich, and context-specific analysis of the role of shame in Aristotle's and Xunzi's views of moral education and the good life. Written with lucidity and poise, the book persuasively demonstrates how rewarding the comparative study of ancient philosophy could be.
Yiqun Zhou, Stanford University
Zhao (Univ. of Cambridge, UK) has written a helpful comparative study of one major thinker from each tradition. Recommended.
CHOICE
In this pioneering study of Aristotle and Xunzi, Jingyi Jenny Zhao develops a sophisticated cross-cultural methodology that, when applied in a close engagement with their views on topics such as the importance of the emotions in moral education and the nature of the good life, yields deeper understanding of issues of philosophical importance both for them and for us today
Geoffrey Lloyd, University of Cambridge
The book is a valuable contribution on many levels. Zhao has developed a clear methodology to compare two distant thinkers. It would be highly valuable if more research could be done employing her methods. The emotion of shame gets a thorough and in-depth analysis that enables an understanding of its social function across cultures. In that way one may even start thinking that shame can be understood as moral integrity or a proto-virtue, a virtue that enables the development of any other virtue. Finally the reader gets an insight into two great thinkers, Aristotle and Xunzi, and sees them in a new comparative perspective that allows a deeper understanding of both of them.
Matylda Amat Obryk, Bryn Mawr Classical Review