In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology,
Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of
injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity
as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in
philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our
epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts
the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space
that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of
epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this
exploration comes a positive account of two corrective
ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena
casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue,
and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue
epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book,
the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way,
to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place
in the broad pattern of social injustice.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780191519307
Publisert
2020
Utgiver
Vendor
Clarendon Press
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter