Motivational hedonism (often called “psychological hedonism”)
claims that everything we do is done in pursuit of pleasure (in the
widest sense) and to avoid pain and displeasure (again, in the widest
sense). Although perennially attractive, many philosophers and
experimental psychologists have claimed to refute it. Human Motives
shows how decision-science and the recent science of affect can be
used to construct a form of motivational hedonism that evades all
previous critiques. On this view, we take decisions by anticipating
and responding affectively to the alternatives, with the pleasure /
displeasure component of affect constituting the common currency of
decision-making. But we do not have to believe that the alternatives
will bring us pleasure or displeasure in the future. Rather, those
feelings get bound into and become parts of the future-directed
representation of the options, rendering the latter attractive or
repulsive. Much then depends on what pleasure and displeasure really
are. If they are intrinsically good or bad properties of experience,
for example, then motivational hedonism results. Carruthers argues, in
contrast, that the best account is a representational one: pleasure
represents its object (nonconceptually, in a perception-like manner)
as good, and displeasure represents it (nonconceptually) as bad. The
result is pluralism about human motivation, making room for both
genuine altruism and intrinsic motives of duty. Clearly written and
deeply scientifically informed, Human Motives has implications for
many areas of philosophy and cognitive science, and will be of
interest to anyone wanting to understand the foundations of human
motivation.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780198906155
Publisert
2023
Utgiver
Vendor
OUP Oxford
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter