The question of how the mind is related to the world has gained new importance in contemporary analytic philosophy. This work demonstrates that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the structure of consciousness can provide fruitful insights for developing an original approach to these questions.

AcknowledgmentsIntroductionChapter 1Why Do We Need a Theory of Constitution?Chapter 2The History of the Notion of Constitution: Two Case Studies2.1 Why Constitution? Why Husserl? Why Haugeland?2.2 Husserl's Notion of Constitution: A Short Outline of its Development2.3 Haugeland's 'Constitutive Standards'2.4 Some Central Features of Constitution: Contrasting Husserl and HaugelandChapter 3Toward a Theory of Constitution3.1 The Fundamental Difference between the Realm of the Mental and the Realm of the Physical3.2 Causal Theories and Holistic Background3.3 Constituting Objects3.4 Developing Constitutive Commitment3.5 The Constitution of Mental EpisodesChapter 4The Social Foundation of the Mind4.1 In What Sense Are Mental Episodes Social?4.2 What Kinds of Rational Relation are there?4.3 Perceptual Experience vs. the Social Dimension of the Logical Space of Reasons: the Brandom-McDowell Debate4.4 The Social Aspect of the Mind and Phenomenological AnalysisChapter 5 Constitution and Idealism5.1 A Wittgensteinian Argument5.2 Constitution and the Realism-Idealism DebateConclusionBibliographyIndex