Sarch's book is a great pleasure and well worth reading and studying.

Craig K. Agule, Criminal Law and Philosophy

This is an excellent book. It's clear and well-argued, and any philosopher working on wilful ignorance and other culpability imputation principles is going to have to engage with it.

Alexander Greenberg, Department of Philosophy, University College London, Journal of Moral Philosophy

The paucity of books on legal fiction is in part due to the density of the concept, but Sarch flushes out some of that density through deliberative and clear prose. An important book in the field, Criminally Ignorant is best suited to legal scholars. ... Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty.

A. R. S. Lorenz, Choice

This is a book about the legal fiction that sometimes we know what we don't. The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants who bury their heads in the sand rather than learn they're doing something criminal are punished as if they knew. Not all legal fictions are unjustified, however. This one, used within proper limits, is a defensible way to promote the aims of the criminal law. Preserving your ignorance can make you as culpable as if you knew what you were doing, and so the interests and values protected by the criminal law can be promoted by treating you as if you had knowledge. This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states based on equal culpability. On the one hand, the theory developed here shows why the willful ignorance doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. Repeated indifference to the truth may substitute for knowledge, and very culpable failures to recognize risks can support treating you as if you took those risks consciously. Moreover, equal culpability imputation should also be applied to corporations, not just individuals. Still, such imputation can be taken too far. We need to determine its limits to avoid injustice. Thus, the book seeks to place equal culpability imputation on a solid normative foundation, while demarcating its proper boundaries. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals a pressing need for reform.
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Acknowledgements Introduction PART I: Foundations Chapter 1: Criminal Law Basics and the Willful Ignorance Doctrine Chapter 2: What Is Criminal Culpability? Part II: From Willful Ignorance to a Theory of Equal Culpability Imputation Chapter 3: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (I) Chapter 4: The Scope of the Willful Ignorance Doctrine (II): The Duty to Reasonably Inform Oneself Chapter 5: Toward a Normative Theory of Equal Culpability Imputation Part III: Beyond Willful Ignorance Chapter 6: Iterated Reckless Ignorance as a Substitute for knowledge Chapter 7: Substituting Willful Ignorance for Purpose? Chapter 8: Sub-Willful Motivated Ignorance Chapter 9: Corporations Keeping Themselves in the Dark Conclusion
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"Sarch's book is a great pleasure and well worth reading and studying." -- Craig K. Agule, Criminal Law and Philosophy "This is an excellent book. It's clear and well-argued, and any philosopher working on wilful ignorance and other culpability imputation principles is going to have to engage with it." -- Alexander Greenberg, Department of Philosophy, University College London, Journal of Moral Philosophy "The paucity of books on legal fiction is in part due to the density of the concept, but Sarch flushes out some of that density through deliberative and clear prose. An important book in the field, Criminally Ignorant is best suited to legal scholars. ... Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty." -- A. R. S. Lorenz, Choice
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Selling point: Combines doctrinal legal scholarship with the conceptual tools of moral philosophy Selling point: Defends concrete criminal law reform proposals Selling point: Defends a theory of criminal culpability as distinct from moral blameworthiness
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Alexander Sarch is a Reader (Associate Professor) and Interim Head of School at the University of Surrey, School of Law.
Selling point: Combines doctrinal legal scholarship with the conceptual tools of moral philosophy Selling point: Defends concrete criminal law reform proposals Selling point: Defends a theory of criminal culpability as distinct from moral blameworthiness
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780190056575
Publisert
2019
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press Inc
Vekt
567 gr
Høyde
236 mm
Bredde
155 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
296

Forfatter

Biografisk notat

Alexander Sarch is a Reader (Associate Professor) and Interim Head of School at the University of Surrey, School of Law.