Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. This volume of 14 essays explores the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. It is of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and those working on truth.

Introduction ; 1. Transparent disquotationalism ; 2. Is the Liar sentence both true and false? ; 3. Spiking the field artillery ; 4. Variations on a theme by Yablo ; 5. A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth ; 6. Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox ; 7. Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too ; 8. Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes ; 9. Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism? ; 10. Semantics for deflationists ; 11. How significant is the Liar? ; 12. The deflationists' axioms for truth ; 13. Naive truth and sophisticated logic ; 14. Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes