"The virtues of this book are many and it is well worth the attention of anyone who is interested in the debate about realism and naturalism in the social sciences. It is extremely clear and well-written, and offers a wealth of detail on the history of the relevant philosophical debates. Though primarily a work of philosophy it is well-grounded in current empirical work in the social and behavioral sciences. If few are ultimately persuaded that the realism
debate must take heed of the social sciences, that measured realism is the best way to do so, or even that social inquiry deserves to be thought of as scientific, this book provides an engaging challenge
against which the reader should test his or her views."--Philosophy of Science
"A radical book, and essential reading for courses in philosophy of science, statistics, and research methods."--Choice
"There is much of value in Trout's book. The careful sorting out of often confused realist claims is welcome. His recognition that the social sciences sometimes have measurement and testing procedures akin to those of the natural sciences is also a welcome antidote to the long tradition of arguing about their scientific status without looking at what they actually do. Trout's claim that assessments of realism issues require carefully looking at specific
theories seems to me particularly valuable."--Philosophical Review
"This is an interesting, complex, and important book. Indeed, it may well be the most important book in the philosophy of the social sciences since Rosenberg's Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science (1980). In addition to developing an original and intriguing naturalistic account of psychology and the social sciences, Trout offers the reader a most nuanced analysis of various forms of scientific realism, as well as a well-developed version of
naturalistic epistemology."--Teaching Philosophy
"The virtues of this book are many and it is well worth the attention of anyone who is interested in the debate about realism and naturalism in the social sciences. It is extremely clear and well-written, and offers a wealth of detail on the history of the relevant philosophical debates. Though primarily a work of philosophy it is well-grounded in current empirical work in the social and behavioral sciences. If few are ultimately persuaded that the realism
debate must take heed of the social sciences, that measured realism is the best way to do so, or even that social inquiry deserves to be thought of as scientific, this book provides an engaging challenge
against which the reader should test his or her views."--Philosophy of Science
"There is much of value in Trout's book. The careful sorting out of often confused realist claims is welcome. His recognition that the social sciences sometimes have measurement and testing procedures akin to those of the natural sciences is also a welcome antidote to the long tradition of arguing about their scientific status without looking at what they actually do. Trout's claim that assessments of realism issues require carefully looking at specific
theories seems to me particularly valuable."--Philosophical Review
"This is an interesting, complex, and important book. Indeed, it may well be the most important book in the philosophy of the social sciences since Rosenberg's Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science (1980). In addition to developing an original and intriguing naturalistic account of psychology and the social sciences, Trout offers the reader a most nuanced analysis of various forms of scientific realism, as well as a well-developed version of
naturalistic epistemology."--Teaching Philosophy
"A radical book, and essential reading for courses in philosophy of science, statistics, and research methods."--Choice
Les mer
