We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of

Preface vii Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 PART ONE Perception and Moral Knowledge 5 Chapter 1 Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensions 7 * I. Major Kinds of Perception 8 * II. The Phenomenology and Content of Perception 12 * III. The Basis of Veridical Perception 21 Chapter 2 Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements 30 * I. The Perception of Right and Wrong 30 * II. The Representational Character of Moral Perception 38 Chapter 3 Perception as a Direct Source of Moral Knowledge 51 * I. Perception and Inference 51 * II. Can Moral Perception Be Naturalized? 55 * III. Moral Perception as a Basis of Moral Knowledge 58 PART TWO Ethical Intuition, Emotional Sensibility, and Moral Judgment 67 Chapter 4 Perceptual Grounds, Ethical Disagreement, and Moral Intuitions 69 * I. Does Moral Disagreement Undermine Justification in Ethics? 70 * II. The Concept of an Intuition 83 * III. Intuitions as Apprehensions 96 Chapter 5 Moral Perception, Aesthetic Perception, and Intuitive Judgment 103 * I. The Role of Intuition in Aesthetic Experience 103 * II. Aesthetic and Moral Properties: Comparison and Contrast 106 * III. The Rule-Governed Element in Ethics and Aesthetics 109 * IV. The Reliability of Intuition 112 Chapter 6 Emotion and Intuition as Sources of Moral Judgment 121 * I. Emotion and Intuition: Interaction and Integration 122 * II. The Evidential Role of Emotion in Moral Matters 136 Chapter 7 The Place of Emotion and Moral Intuition in Normative Ethics 143 * I. Emotion and Moral Intuition 143 * II. Moral Imagination as a Nexus of Intuition, Emotion, and Perception 157 * III. Intuition and Moral Judgment 161 Conclusion 170 Index 175

"This book defends the most illuminating and novel theory of moral perception to date. In making a case for objectivity in ethics, Robert Audi insightfully explores the relations between moral perception, intuition, emotion, and imagination. His clear and engaging style, and his use of many examples to explain and illuminate the key distinctions and ideas, makes the book accessible to students, while its substantial contribution to ethical theory makes it a must-read for experts."—Mark Timmons, University of Arizona

"I don't know of any other work in recent years that has examined moral perception so thoroughly or with such epistemological sophistication. Audi's book makes an important contribution to the unduly neglected field of moral epistemology, and it should interest a broad philosophical audience."—Noah Lemos, College of William and Mary