Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
Maximilian Kiener is Extraordinary Junior Research Fellow and ERC Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, UK.This book introduces a novel puzzle, the 'Lorry Driver Paradox', to advance our understanding of moral responsibility beyond current paradigms, to connect moral philosophy and legal scholarship in new ways, and to break new ground in the ethics of AI.
Part 1 introduces the Lorry Driver Paradox as a set of three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. It then develops and defends the concept of strict moral answerability as the most effective solution, making it the central idea of the book, alongside an account of how ‘taking responsibility’ could amount to a new, hitherto neglected normative power and an exploration of the significance of apologies in our social practices.
Part 2 extends this discussion to the context of artificial intelligence, proposing a major shift in how we currently think about responsibility and AI. It challenges the conventional notion of AI-generated ‘responsibility gaps’ and, instead, proposes the idea of ‘responsibility abundance’. This reframing, it is argued, offers distinct theoretical, dialectical, and practical advantages.
Significant parts of these arguments draw on legal scholarship, particularly considerations about reverse burdens of proof in criminal law and the waiving of state immunity in public international law. On these grounds, the book also pursues the methodological idea of a ‘legal lead’, that is, the idea that we can advance our understanding of moral responsibility by investigating (selected aspects of) legal responsibility, and not just the other way around.
Introduction
Part One: Moral Responsibility
1. The Lorry Driver Paradox
2. Strict Moral Answerability
3. Taking Responsibility as a Normative Power
4. Pascal's Apology
5. The Strictness First Approach
Part Two: Artificial Inteliigence
6. The Autonmous AI Conundrum
7. The Abundance of Strict Moral Answerability
8. Closing AI's Responsibility Gap at Will
9. AI and the Value of Responsibility
10. The ABC of Responsible AI
Conclusion
Stimulating works that address fundamental issues in legal philosophy.
The intention of this series is that it should encompass monographs and collections of essays that address the fundamental issues in legal philosophy. The foci are conceptual and normative in character, not empirical. Studies addressing the idea of law as a species of practical reason are especially welcome. Recognizing that there is no occasion to sharply distinguish analytic and systematic work in the field from historico-critical research, the editors also welcome studies in the history of legal philosophy. Contributions to the series, inevitably crossing disciplinary lines, will be of interest to students and professionals in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
Advisory Board
Prof Robert Alexy (Kiel)
Prof Samantha Besson (Fribourg, CH)
Prof Sean Coyle (University of Birmingham)
Prof Mattias Kumm (New York)
Prof Stanley Paulson (St. Louis and Kiel)
Prof Arthur Ripstein (Toronto)
Prof Scott Shapiro (Yale Law School)
Prof Victor Tadros (Warwick)
Previous members of the Advisory Board:
Emilios Christodoulidis +
Neil MacCormick +
Joseph Raz +
Cover art by Jane Couroussopoulos:
www.janepaint.com