The contents of the inaugural volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics nicely mirror the variety of issues that make this area of philosophy so interesting. The volume opens with Peter Railton's exploration of some central features of normative guidance, the mental states that underwrite it, and its relationship to our reasons for feeling and acting. In the next offering, Terence Cuneo takes up the case against expressivism, arguing that its central account of the nature of moral judgments is badly mistaken. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, two of the most prominent contemporary expressivists, then offer their take on how expressivism manages to avoid a different objection-that of collapsing into an objectionable form of relativism. Daniel Jacobson and Justin D'Arms next offer an article that continues their research program devoted to exploring the extent to which values might depend upon, or be constrained by, human psychology. Ralph Wedgwood engages in some classical metaethical conceptual analysis, seeking to explicate the meaning of ought. Mark van Roojen then contributes a new take on the Moral Twin Earth Argument, a prominent anti-realist puzzle advanced in the early 1990s by Horgan and Timmons.
Allan Gibbard next presents his latest thoughts on the nature of moral feelings and moral concepts, crucial elements in the overall project of defending the expressivism he is so well known for. James Dreier then takes up the details of Gibbard's recent efforts to provide a solution to what many view as the most serious difficulty for expressivism, namely, the Frege-Geach problem. Dreier identifies difficulties in Gibbard's expressivist account, and offers a suggestion for their solution. Sergio Tenenbaum explores the concept of a direction of fit, relied on so heavily nowadays in accounts of moral motivation. Nadeem Hussain and Nishiten Shah then consider the merits of Christine Korsgaard's influential critique of moral realism. T. M. Scanlon's widely-discussed buck-passing account of value attracts the critical eye of Pekka Väyrynen, who attempts to reveal the reasons that we might resist it. Derek Parfit's contribution concludes this volume, with an article on normativity that presents his most recent thinking on this fundamental notion.
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Focusing on original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics, this periodical publication provides an annual selection of much of the best scholarship done in the field. It includes the work done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.
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1. Normative guidance ; 2. Saying what we mean: an argument against expressivism ; 3. Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no! ; 4. Anthropocentric constraints on human value ; 5. The meaning of the 'ought' ; 6. Knowing enough to disagree: a new response to the moral twin earth argument ; 7. Moral feelings and moral concepts ; 8. Negation for expressivists: a collection of problems with a suggestion for their solution ; 9. Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism ; 10. Misunderstanding metaethics: Korsgaard's rejection of realism ; 11. Resisting the buck-passing account of value ; 12. Normativity
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The first volume in a brand new annual series
The latest and most exciting research in one of philosophy's hottest fields
Features important new work by big names in the field
Edited by an internationally respected ethicist
Covers a fascinating spectrum of topics
All papers published here for the first time
Les mer
The first volume in a brand new annual series
The latest and most exciting research in one of philosophy's hottest fields
Features important new work by big names in the field
Edited by an internationally respected ethicist
Covers a fascinating spectrum of topics
All papers published here for the first time
Les mer
Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780199291892
Publisert
2006
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
502 gr
Høyde
216 mm
Bredde
131 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Antall sider
394
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