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Risk and Rationality

Buchak, Lara
Innbundet / 2013 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199672165
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
556 gr
Høyde
239 mm
Bredde
162 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
U, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
274

Forfatter
Buchak, Lara

Biografisk notat

Lara Buchak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Berkeley. She received her AB from Harvard College in philosophy and mathematics in 2003, and her PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 2009. Her primary research is in decision-making, particularly decision-making in the face of risk. She also has interests in epistemology, in philosophy of religion, and in social choice theory. Some topics she has written on include when and why one ought to stop looking for more evidence and make a decision; what is the nature of faith, both in the religious and the more mundane sense; and what is the relationship between assigning probability to a hypothesis and outright believing that hypothesis.

Risk and Rationality

Buchak, Lara
Innbundet / 2013 / Engelsk
Buchak, Lara
Innbundet / 2013 / Engelsk
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[T]he level of argument is very high and arguments are pursued in detail over a wide range of sub-topics ... the book as a whole contains a wealth of useful material, of which Buchak's exposition is thorough and extensive without straying off the point. Almost anyone who cares about the subject of this book is likely to learn much from it that is worth learning. It is all in all an excellent addition to the literature.

Arif Ahmed, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Risk and Rationality is a valuable addition to any decision theory library. Buchak provides an exceptionally clear, careful, and sustained defense of a theory for reasoning about uncertainty that takes risk into account.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

Given the technical nature of its subject matter, Risk and Rationality is surprisingly easy to follow. Buchak's writing is free of jargon and she manages to explain even the technical details of her theory in such a non-technical way that I am sure any student of philosophy will be able to follow her discussion.

H. Orri Stefansson, Journal of Economics and Philosophy

Lara Buchak sets out an original account of the principles that govern rational decision-making in the face of risk. A distinctive feature of these decisions is that individuals are forced to consider how their choices will turn out under various circumstances, and decide how to trade off the possibility that a choice will turn out well against the possibility that it will turn out poorly. The orthodox view is that there is only one acceptable way to do this: rational individuals must maximize expected utility. Buchak's contention, however, is that the orthodox theory (expected utility theory) dictates an overly narrow way in which considerations about risk can play a role in an individual's choices. Combining research from economics and philosophy, she argues for an alternative, more permissive, theory of decision-making: one that allows individuals to pay special attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario (among other 'global features' of gambles). This theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory, better captures the preferences of actual decision-makers. Furthermore, it isolates the distinct roles that beliefs, desires, and risk-attitudes play in decision-making. Finally, contra the orthodox view, Buchak argues that decision-makers whose preferences can be captured by risk-weighted expected utility theory are rational. Thus, Risk and Rationality is in many ways a vindication of the ordinary decision-maker--particularly his or her attitude towards risk--from the point of view of even ideal rationality.
Les mer
Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view (expected utility theory) is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
Les mer
Introduction ; 1. InstInstrumental Rationality and Expected Utility Theory ; 2. Risk-Weighted Expected Utility ; 3. Representation ; 4. Redescription ; 5. Consistency ; 6. Diachronic Choice ; 7. Bookmaking and Packaging ; 8. Conclusion ; Appendices ; Bibliography ; Index
Les mer
Original work on the understanding of mind and behaviour Introduces key arguments and presents a brand new theory in a clear and accessible style
Lara Buchak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Berkeley. She received her AB from Harvard College in philosophy and mathematics in 2003, and her PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 2009. Her primary research is in decision-making, particularly decision-making in the face of risk. She also has interests in epistemology, in philosophy of religion, and in social choice theory. Some topics she has written on include when and why one ought to stop looking for more evidence and make a decision; what is the nature of faith, both in the religious and the more mundane sense; and what is the relationship between assigning probability to a hypothesis and outright believing that hypothesis.
Les mer
Original work on the understanding of mind and behaviour Introduces key arguments and presents a brand new theory in a clear and accessible style

Relaterte produkter

[T]he level of argument is very high and arguments are pursued in detail over a wide range of sub-topics ... the book as a whole contains a wealth of useful material, of which Buchak's exposition is thorough and extensive without straying off the point. Almost anyone who cares about the subject of this book is likely to learn much from it that is worth learning. It is all in all an excellent addition to the literature.

Arif Ahmed, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Risk and Rationality is a valuable addition to any decision theory library. Buchak provides an exceptionally clear, careful, and sustained defense of a theory for reasoning about uncertainty that takes risk into account.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

Given the technical nature of its subject matter, Risk and Rationality is surprisingly easy to follow. Buchak's writing is free of jargon and she manages to explain even the technical details of her theory in such a non-technical way that I am sure any student of philosophy will be able to follow her discussion.

H. Orri Stefansson, Journal of Economics and Philosophy

Lara Buchak sets out an original account of the principles that govern rational decision-making in the face of risk. A distinctive feature of these decisions is that individuals are forced to consider how their choices will turn out under various circumstances, and decide how to trade off the possibility that a choice will turn out well against the possibility that it will turn out poorly. The orthodox view is that there is only one acceptable way to do this: rational individuals must maximize expected utility. Buchak's contention, however, is that the orthodox theory (expected utility theory) dictates an overly narrow way in which considerations about risk can play a role in an individual's choices. Combining research from economics and philosophy, she argues for an alternative, more permissive, theory of decision-making: one that allows individuals to pay special attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario (among other 'global features' of gambles). This theory, risk-weighted expected utility theory, better captures the preferences of actual decision-makers. Furthermore, it isolates the distinct roles that beliefs, desires, and risk-attitudes play in decision-making. Finally, contra the orthodox view, Buchak argues that decision-makers whose preferences can be captured by risk-weighted expected utility theory are rational. Thus, Risk and Rationality is in many ways a vindication of the ordinary decision-maker--particularly his or her attitude towards risk--from the point of view of even ideal rationality.
Les mer
Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view (expected utility theory) is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
Les mer
Introduction ; 1. InstInstrumental Rationality and Expected Utility Theory ; 2. Risk-Weighted Expected Utility ; 3. Representation ; 4. Redescription ; 5. Consistency ; 6. Diachronic Choice ; 7. Bookmaking and Packaging ; 8. Conclusion ; Appendices ; Bibliography ; Index
Les mer
Original work on the understanding of mind and behaviour Introduces key arguments and presents a brand new theory in a clear and accessible style
Lara Buchak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Berkeley. She received her AB from Harvard College in philosophy and mathematics in 2003, and her PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 2009. Her primary research is in decision-making, particularly decision-making in the face of risk. She also has interests in epistemology, in philosophy of religion, and in social choice theory. Some topics she has written on include when and why one ought to stop looking for more evidence and make a decision; what is the nature of faith, both in the religious and the more mundane sense; and what is the relationship between assigning probability to a hypothesis and outright believing that hypothesis.
Les mer
Original work on the understanding of mind and behaviour Introduces key arguments and presents a brand new theory in a clear and accessible style

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199672165
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
556 gr
Høyde
239 mm
Bredde
162 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
U, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
274

Forfatter
Buchak, Lara

Biografisk notat

Lara Buchak is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at UC Berkeley. She received her AB from Harvard College in philosophy and mathematics in 2003, and her PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 2009. Her primary research is in decision-making, particularly decision-making in the face of risk. She also has interests in epistemology, in philosophy of religion, and in social choice theory. Some topics she has written on include when and why one ought to stop looking for more evidence and make a decision; what is the nature of faith, both in the religious and the more mundane sense; and what is the relationship between assigning probability to a hypothesis and outright believing that hypothesis.

Relaterte produkter