This book provides an overall theory of perception and much of a theory of knowledge. It explains how we can have justified beliefs and knowledge concerning the physical world, the abstract realm, and the normative domain of right and wrong.

Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Part One: Perception Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World I. Perception Broadly Conceived II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception III. The Representational Character of Perception Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels V. Is Perception Theory-Laden? VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification I. Perceptual Knowledge II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy IV. Reasons as Explanations V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification I. Epistemological Internalism II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification? III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification V. The Disjunctivist Challenge VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief VII. Perception and Singular Reference Part Two: Perception and the A Priori Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension I. Perception and Intuition II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori I. The Concept of Self-Evidence II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident III. Understanding and Imagination IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification VI. Comprehensional Adequacy VII. Obstacles to Comprehension Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity I. Self-Evidence and Provability II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident? III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities V. Apriority and Necessity Part Three: Practical Knowledge Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action I. Belief and Action II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action I. Inference and Inferential Belief II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation III. Reasoning and Rational Action IV. The Scope of Rational Action V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action References Index

"Audi is one of the most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers working today ... The argumentation in is rich and complex . . . the book represents an important contribution to current debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind." -- B. T. Harding, CHOICE "Seeing, Knowing and Doing is a gem. Clearly and concisely, it manages to tackle some of the deepest issues in epistemology. . . such as the nature of perception, its role in justification, the relationship between justification and knowledge, the nature and extent of the a priori, the nature of know-how and the relation between perception and action, while proposing innovative views on all these fronts." -- Annalisa Coliva, University of California, Irvine "Seeing, Knowing, and Doing offers a comprehensive picture of perception, knowledge, and agency. At its center is the idea that perception is a starting point for knowledge, as for many other epistemic and practical achievements. The book tells a complete story of the role of perception in our cognitive and epistemic lives. Wide-ranging and rigorous, it balances respect for our intuitions with theoretical consistency and completeness." -- Zöe Jenkin, Rutgers University "Throughout his distinguished career, Audi has reflected as deeply as anyone on the nature and role of perceptual experience as guides to belief and action, where his own reflection is informed by his penetrating account of a priori justification as grounded in self-evidence. Engaging contemporary debates on the a priori, perceptual knowledge, practical reason, know-how, and action, Seeing, Knowing, and Doing provides a first-rate elaboration of Audi's unique perspective on the normativity of experience for both belief and action." -- Peter J. Graham, University of California, Riverside

Robert Audi, John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Robert Audi is internationally known for his books, articles, and lectures in ethics (including political philosophy), the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. His books since 2000 include Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge 2000), a theory of the relation between church and state and, for individuals, between religion and politics; The Architecture of Reason (Oxford 2001), a theory of rationality that provides a partial foundation for ethics; The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton 2004), a presentation of some main elements in Audi's view in ethics; Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (Routledge 2006), an account of the nature and varieties of practical reasoning and its relation to moral standards; Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford 2007), a non-technical presentation of major approaches in ethics and value theory; Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford 2011), a comprehensive monograph in philosophy of religion (derived from the Wilde Lectures given much earlier at Oxford); Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), a theory of perceptual moral knowledge and its relation to emotion, intuition, and objectivity in ethics; Seeing, Knowing, and Doing (Oxford 2020), an account of perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and how both underlie our actions; Of Moral Conduct: A Theory of Obligation, Reasons, and Value (Cambridge 2023); and (as Editor) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2015). Audi is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, a former director of National Endowment for the Humanities Seminars and Institutes, a recipient of prizes and honors for lifetime contributions to philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and presently John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame. His B. A. is from Colgate University, his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.

Selling point: Presents a full-scale theory of perception by a leading philosopher in the field Selling point: Offers an original account of the a priori, the realm of pure math and of basic moral truths Selling point: Integrates a theory of practical knowledge with a psychologically realistic account of human knowledge and action