Simon Kirchin's Thick Concepts is a very welcome addition to the literature.

Christopher Cowie, The Times Literary Supplement

The contributions are varied, combative and intellectually high class.

Edward Skidelsky, Philosophical Quarterly

What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works.
Les mer
An international team of experts explores the distinction between 'thin' concepts (general, evaluative terms like 'good' and 'bad') and 'thick' concepts (more specific concepts, such as 'brave', or 'rude'). Their essays touch on key debates in metaethics about the evaluative and normative, and raise fascinating questions about how language works.
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1. Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts ; 2. Thick Concepts, Analysis, and Reductionism ; 3. Practical Concepts ; 4. Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions ; 5. It's Evaluation, only Thicker ; 6. On the Nature and Significance of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts ; 7. Disentangling Disentangling ; 8. Thick Concepts and Underdetermination ; 9. Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality ; 10. There are no Thin Concepts ; 11. Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: what Moral Philosophy can Learn from Aesthetics ; 12. Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action ; 13. Well-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of Labor between Moral Philosophy and Positive Psychology ; Index
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New work from a team of leading experts The first book-length study on the subject Includes a comprehensive introduction, which provides an overview of the current and historic field
Simon Kirchin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He is the author of Metaethics (Palgrave, 2012), and the editor of Arguing about Metaethics (with Andrew Fisher; Routledge, 2006), and A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (with Richard Joyce' Springer, 2009). He is currently writing a book about thick and thin concepts.
Les mer
New work from a team of leading experts The first book-length study on the subject Includes a comprehensive introduction, which provides an overview of the current and historic field

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199672349
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
532 gr
Høyde
241 mm
Bredde
162 mm
Dybde
20 mm
Aldersnivå
UU, UP, 05
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
248

Redaktør

Biografisk notat

Simon Kirchin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He is the author of Metaethics (Palgrave, 2012), and the editor of Arguing about Metaethics (with Andrew Fisher; Routledge, 2006), and A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (with Richard Joyce' Springer, 2009). He is currently writing a book about thick and thin concepts.