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From Valuing to Value A Defense of Subjectivism

Sobel David
Innbundet / 2016 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780198712640
Publisert
2016
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
590 gr
Høyde
239 mm
Bredde
168 mm
Dybde
24 mm
Aldersnivå
U, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
322

Forfatter
Sobel David

Biografisk notat

David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.

From Valuing to Value A Defense of Subjectivism

Sobel David
Innbundet / 2016 / Engelsk
Sobel David
Innbundet / 2016 / Engelsk
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This book is a substantial achievement ... I unhesitatingly recommend it to anyone interested in reasons, well-being or rationality.

Luke Elson, Analysis

The book is a showcase of first-rate value theory in the analytic tradition, tightly situated in debates about the nature of well-being and the nature of normative reasons, with a few forays into moral theory and moral psychology.

Owen C. King, Utilitas

Sobel's book is an extremely fair and subtle examination of subjectivism as well as of some arguments against subjectivism such as Parfit's and Scanlon's critiques. All essays in this collection two of them are co-authored by David Copp are very clearly written, contain lots of well-grounded arguments and are therefore of greatest interest for those who tend to think that subjectivism is true as well as for those who tend to think that this account is wrong.

Tobias Gutmann, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Se alle

Sobel's essays in this book are some of the finest ever written in moral philosophy. Whatever one's favoured theory of value, I hope we can all agree that this book is an invaluable resource.

Ben Bramble, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Subjective accounts of well-being and reasons for action have a remarkable pedigree. The idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about-that something is valuable because it is valued-has appealed to a wide range of great thinkers. But at the same time this idea has seemed to many of the best minds in ethics to be outrageous or worse, not least because it seems to threaten the status of morality. Mutual incomprehension looms over the discussion. From Valuing to Value, written by an influential former critic of subjectivism, owns up to the problematic features to which critics have pointed while arguing that such criticisms can be blunted and the overall view rendered defensible. In this collection of his essays David Sobel does not shrink from acknowledging the real tension between subjective views of reasons and morality, yet argues that such a tension does not undermine subjectivism. In this volume the fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and revealed to be rather plausible and well-motivated, while the most influential criticisms of subjectivism are straightforwardly addressed and found wanting.
Les mer
David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.
Les mer
Introduction 1: Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral 2: Full Information Accounts of Well-Being 3: On the Subjectivity of Welfare 4: Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration 5: Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge? 6: Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action 7: Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action 8: (co-authored with David Copp): Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire 9: Varieties of Hedonism 10: (co-authored with David Copp): Morality and Virtue 11: Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste 12: The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection 13: Subjectivism and Idealization 14: Parfit s Case Against Subjectivism 15: Subjectivism and Proportionalism
Les mer
Objections to subjectivism clearly explained and addressed The fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and argued for A major understanding of value and where it comes from is fully examined The upshot for ethics of subjectivism is fully explored
Les mer
David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.
Les mer
Objections to subjectivism clearly explained and addressed The fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and argued for A major understanding of value and where it comes from is fully examined The upshot for ethics of subjectivism is fully explored
Les mer

Relaterte produkter

This book is a substantial achievement ... I unhesitatingly recommend it to anyone interested in reasons, well-being or rationality.

Luke Elson, Analysis

The book is a showcase of first-rate value theory in the analytic tradition, tightly situated in debates about the nature of well-being and the nature of normative reasons, with a few forays into moral theory and moral psychology.

Owen C. King, Utilitas

Sobel's book is an extremely fair and subtle examination of subjectivism as well as of some arguments against subjectivism such as Parfit's and Scanlon's critiques. All essays in this collection two of them are co-authored by David Copp are very clearly written, contain lots of well-grounded arguments and are therefore of greatest interest for those who tend to think that subjectivism is true as well as for those who tend to think that this account is wrong.

Tobias Gutmann, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Se alle

Sobel's essays in this book are some of the finest ever written in moral philosophy. Whatever one's favoured theory of value, I hope we can all agree that this book is an invaluable resource.

Ben Bramble, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Subjective accounts of well-being and reasons for action have a remarkable pedigree. The idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about-that something is valuable because it is valued-has appealed to a wide range of great thinkers. But at the same time this idea has seemed to many of the best minds in ethics to be outrageous or worse, not least because it seems to threaten the status of morality. Mutual incomprehension looms over the discussion. From Valuing to Value, written by an influential former critic of subjectivism, owns up to the problematic features to which critics have pointed while arguing that such criticisms can be blunted and the overall view rendered defensible. In this collection of his essays David Sobel does not shrink from acknowledging the real tension between subjective views of reasons and morality, yet argues that such a tension does not undermine subjectivism. In this volume the fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and revealed to be rather plausible and well-motivated, while the most influential criticisms of subjectivism are straightforwardly addressed and found wanting.
Les mer
David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.
Les mer
Introduction 1: Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral 2: Full Information Accounts of Well-Being 3: On the Subjectivity of Welfare 4: Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration 5: Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge? 6: Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action 7: Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action 8: (co-authored with David Copp): Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire 9: Varieties of Hedonism 10: (co-authored with David Copp): Morality and Virtue 11: Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste 12: The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection 13: Subjectivism and Idealization 14: Parfit s Case Against Subjectivism 15: Subjectivism and Proportionalism
Les mer
Objections to subjectivism clearly explained and addressed The fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and argued for A major understanding of value and where it comes from is fully examined The upshot for ethics of subjectivism is fully explored
Les mer
David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.
Les mer
Objections to subjectivism clearly explained and addressed The fundamental commitments of subjectivism are clarified and argued for A major understanding of value and where it comes from is fully examined The upshot for ethics of subjectivism is fully explored
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780198712640
Publisert
2016
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Vekt
590 gr
Høyde
239 mm
Bredde
168 mm
Dybde
24 mm
Aldersnivå
U, P, 05, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
322

Forfatter
Sobel David

Biografisk notat

David Sobel is Guttag Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at Syracuse University. Much of his research has reflected an abiding interest in understanding and defending desire-based or subjectivist accounts of well-being and reasons for action. With Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall he co-edits Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy.

Relaterte produkter