Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
David Greentree graduated with a BA in History at York before completing an MA in War Studies at King's College London. As part of the Royal Air Force, he served in a variety of locations, including Afghanistan. He is currently working in the Ministry of Defence in London.
Mark Stacey has been a freelance illustrator since 1987, specialising in military history. Mark completed the cover art for this volume.
On 25 May 1944, 800 men of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion descended on Drvar, a town behind enemy lines in north-western Bosnia.
Their aim was to kill or capture Tito, the leader of the partisan movement in the region. The plan was to land the battalion by glider and parachute in two waves which would be relieved the next day by a ground assault. Tito knew an attack was imminent but dismissed the idea of an airborne assault.
The attempt to eliminate Tito was a colossal failure. The elite battalion had been decimated, with only 200 men fit for duty the next day. Inter-agency rivalry between the Abwehr and the SS had meant that intelligence was not shared, a problem exacerbated by a failure to exploit HUMINT about Tito's precise location and the adoption of a plan that did not take into account these intelligence limitations.
Featuring illustrations throughout, this is an in-depth account of this daring German raid.
Introduction
Origins
The Plan
The Raid
Aftermath
Analysis
Further Reading
On 25 May 1944, 800 men of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion descended on Drvar, a town behind enemy lines in north-western Bosnia.
Their aim was to kill or capture Tito, the leader of the partisan movement in the region. The plan was to land the battalion by glider and parachute in two waves which would be relieved the next day by a ground assault. Tito knew an attack was imminent but dismissed the idea of an airborne assault.
The attempt to eliminate Tito was a colossal failure. The elite battalion had been decimated, with only 200 men fit for duty the next day. Inter-agency rivalry between the Abwehr and the SS had meant that intelligence was not shared, a problem exacerbated by a failure to exploit HUMINT about Tito's precise location and the adoption of a plan that did not take into account these intelligence limitations.
Featuring illustrations throughout, this is an in-depth account of this daring German raid.
Introduction
Origins
The Plan
The Raid
Aftermath
Analysis
Further Reading
Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
David Greentree graduated with a BA in History at York before completing an MA in War Studies at King's College London. As part of the Royal Air Force, he served in a variety of locations, including Afghanistan. He is currently working in the Ministry of Defence in London.
Mark Stacey has been a freelance illustrator since 1987, specialising in military history. Mark completed the cover art for this volume.