This volume disproves the claim that America's defeat in Vietnam was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to 'fight with one hand tied behind their backs.'

1. Introduction; 2. Prologue to tragedy: US military opposition to intervention in Vietnam, 1950–1954; 3. Preparing for and avoiding war: military affairs and politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955–1960; 4. Pinning down the president: JFK, the military, and political manoeuvering over Vietnam, January–October 1961; 5. The best and worst of times: the US war against Vietnam, October 1961–November 1963; 6. 'Seeing things through Vietnam': LBJ, the military, and the growing U.S. commitment to Vietnam, November 1963–December 1964; 7. Hope for the best, expect the worst: US ground troops enter the war in Vietnam, January–July 1965; 8. War on three fronts: US forces vs. the VC, Westmoreland vs. the marine, and the military leaders vs. the White House, July 1965–December 1966; 9. 'The platform of false prophets is crowded': public hope and private despair in Vietnam, 1967; 10. The myth of the Tet: military failure and the politics of war; 11. Conclusion: bringing it all back home; Epilogue; Notes; Bibliography.