Given debates surrounding the emerging “new Cold War,” this book provides a much needed revisit into the US foreign policy nuclear domain during the 1945-1990 period. Across nine chapters, the monograph traces the United States’ nuclear diplomacy and Presidential strategic thought, transitioning across the early period of Cold War arms racing through to the era’s defining conclusion. It reveals that despite the heightened periods when great power conflict seemed imminent, arms control fora and seminal agreements were able to be devised and implemented, providing a needed base in improving bilateral relations—as well as momentarily bringing down the specter of a cataclysmic nuclear war.
Aiden Warren, Associate Professor of International Relations, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia.
Joseph M. Siracusa, Professor of Political History and International Security, School of Media,Creative Arts and Social Inquiry, Curtin University, Perth, Australia.
“In US Presidents and Cold War Nuclear Diplomacy, Warren and Siracusa have effectively synthesized and analyzed the contours of presidential leadership on nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Their account highlights both the significance of the issue for that conflict, and seeks applicable lessons for today’s international environment, and the return of “Great Power competition” and the possibility of a new nuclear arms race. This is an important book that should be read by both policy-makers and students of international relations.
—Thomas Schwartz, Professor of History and Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
“This is an important and timely book. At a time when tensions between the United States and China and Iran (not to mention Russia and North Korea) are perilously escalating, this analysis of United States Cold War nuclear diplomacy through nine presidents powerfully demonstrates the dangers, and more importantly the futility, of portrayals and overblown rhetorical exaggerations by US leaders and their allies when describing the ambitions, intentions, and capabilities, of their adversaries. Warren and Siracusa persuasively argue that in this post-Cold War age of nuclear proliferation what is needed to enhance national security is quiet cooperative nuclear control diplomacy, not alarmist public rhetoric. It is a cautionary tale that should be read by everyone—especially by policy-makers and politicians. —Ian J. Bickerton, Professor of History, University of New South Wales, Australia