Assertive bargaining occurs from time to time in the US Congress. It became an important feature of legislative negotiations within the House Republican Party when, following the 2014 elections, a group of organized conservatives called the House Freedom Caucus regularly issued threats against its own party's leadership. Such behavior by an ideologically extreme bloc of lawmakers is not accounted for by existing theories of legislative politics. This Element posits explanations for why such threat-making might occur and what might increase its likelihood of success, then tests those explanations using the Freedom Caucus as a case study.
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1. Threat-making and bargaining in Congress; 2. A brief introduction to the House Freedom Caucus; 3. The influence of the House Freedom Caucus; 4. Threat-making and leadership selection; 5. Other costs and benefits of legislative threat-making; 6. Conclusion.
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Explores reasons why a specific group of organized conservatives threaten its own leadership, and what could improve its likelihood of success.

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9781108735810
Publisert
2019-02-14
Utgiver
Cambridge University Press
Vekt
560 gr
Høyde
230 mm
Bredde
150 mm
Dybde
5 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Antall sider
86

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