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Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Arrow Kenneth J. Sen A. Suzumura Kotaro
Innbundet / 2010 / Engelsk

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780444508942
Publisert
2010-10-13
Utgiver
Vendor
North-Holland
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
191 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
992

Redaktør
Arrow Kenneth J.
Sen A.
Suzumura Kotaro

Biografisk notat

Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, emeritus; a CHP/PCOR fellow; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is the joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at 51. In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves. His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information. He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mid-1980s.

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Arrow Kenneth J. Sen A. Suzumura Kotaro
Innbundet / 2010 / Engelsk
Arrow Kenneth J. Sen A. Suzumura Kotaro
Innbundet / 2010 / Engelsk
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"This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice.  It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates." --Steven Brams, New York University

"This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area." --Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside

"Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field." --Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
Les mer
Describes economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. This book is suitable for those who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making.
Les mer
Preface to Volume 2 Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva) Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb) Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster) Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera) 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).
Les mer
Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship
Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship
Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
Les mer

Relaterte produkter

"This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice.  It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates." --Steven Brams, New York University

"This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area." --Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside

"Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field." --Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
Les mer
Describes economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. This book is suitable for those who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making.
Les mer
Preface to Volume 2 Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva) Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb) Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster) Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera) 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).
Les mer
Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship
Detailed surveys by leaders in the field examine major contributions to social choice scholarship
Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes
Les mer

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780444508942
Publisert
2010-10-13
Utgiver
Vendor
North-Holland
Høyde
235 mm
Bredde
191 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
992

Redaktør
Arrow Kenneth J.
Sen A.
Suzumura Kotaro

Biografisk notat

Kenneth Arrow is the Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, emeritus; a CHP/PCOR fellow; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is the joint winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with John Hicks in 1972. To date, he is the youngest person to have received this award, at 51. In economics, he is a figure in post-World War II neo-classical economic theory. Many of his former graduate students have gone on to win the Nobel Memorial Prize themselves. His most significant works are his contributions to social choice theory, notably "Arrow's impossibility theorem", and his work on general equilibrium analysis. He has also provided foundational work in many other areas of economics, including endogenous growth theory and the economics of information. He has been co-editor of the Handbooks in Economics series since the mid-1980s.

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