There has been a philosophical upheaval recently in our understanding
of the metaphysics of the mind. The philosophy of mind and action has
traditionally treated its subject matter as consisting of states and
events, and completely ignored the category of ongoing process. So the
mental things that happen - experiences and actions - have been taken
to be completed events and not ongoing processes. But events by their
very nature as completed wholes are never present to the agent or
subject; only ongoing processes can be present to a subject in the way
required for conscious experience and practical self-knowledge. This
suggests that a proper understanding of processes is required to
understand subjective experience and agency. This volume explores the
possibility and advantages of taking processes to be the subject
matter of the philosophy of mind and action. The central defining
feature of the process argument is its use of the progressive (as
opposed to perfective) aspect. But beyond this, philosophers working
on the metaphysics of processes do not agree. The contributors to this
volume take up this argument in the metaphysics of processes. Are
processes continuants? Are they particulars at all, or should we
rather be thinking of process activity as a kind of stuff? Process,
Action, and Experience considers whether practical reasoning and
practical self-knowledge require thinking of action in process terms,
and it considers arguments for the processive nature of conscious
experience.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780192538093
Publisert
2020
Utgave
1. utgave
Utgiver
Vendor
OUP Oxford
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter