Members of Congress often delegate power to bureaucratic experts, but
they fear losing permanent control of the policy. One way Congress has
dealt with this problem is to require reauthorization of the program
or policy. Cox argues that Congress uses this power selectively, and
is more likely to require reauthorization when policy is complex or
they do not trust the executive branch. By contrast, reauthorization
is less likely to be required when there are large disagreements about
policy within Congress. In the process, Cox shows that committees are
important independent actors in the legislative process, and that
committees with homogenous policy preferences may have an advantage in
getting their bills through Congress.
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Produktdetaljer
ISBN
9780313057342
Publisert
2023
Utgave
1. utgave
Utgiver
Vendor
Praeger
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Digital bok
Forfatter