<p>Cohen’s book has a number of admirable qualities. In addition to tackling a critically important question, the theory is refreshing in its focus on the experiences of individual leaders. . . . Cohen’s book is an important step toward understanding the role of psychology and leader experiences in nuclear decision-making.</p>
H-Diplo
<p>An original, innovative contribution to security studies, and to contemporary attempts to develop leader-based theories of nuclear behavior. It charts a new path for scholars interested in pursuing application of cognitive biases in nuclear studies.</p>
Perspectives on Politics
<p>An original, innovative contribution to security studies, and to contemporary attempts to develop leader-based theories of nuclear behavior. It charts a new path for scholars interested in pursuing the application of cognitive biases in nuclear studies....an important book that contributes new insights to the field of nuclear studies.</p>
Perspectives on Politics
<p>Cohen analyzes how politicians learn from and adapt after crises and demonstrates just how sobering the prospect of war can be.</p>
Foreign Affairs
<p>Cohen provides a detailed, well-researched, and structured analysis of crucial questions regarding the dangers of nuclear proliferation.</p>
Political Science Quarterly
<p>When Proliferation Causes Peace is a lively, entertaining book with a provocative, interesting thesis. Cohen offers a nuanced assessment of the impact of proliferation on state behavior, with expectations based not upon fictional homo-economic states but realistic understandings of human psychology.</p>
Political Psychology
<p>It is useful, even vital, to use political-science methods to seek a better understanding of the general behavioral tendencies of top leaders in nuclear affairs. Cohen’s book is a fine example of how to do it.</p>
The Nonproliferation Review
Does state acquisition of nuclear weapons lead to stability and peace or instability and crises? Michael D. Cohen argues that nuclear weapons acquisition often does dangerously embolden the acquiring state to undertake coercion and aggression, but that this behavior moderates over time as leaders learn the dangers and limitations of nuclear coercion. This book examines the historical cases of the Soviet Union and Pakistan in depth and also looks at mini-cases involving the United States, China, and India. This book broadens our understanding of how leaders and states behave when they acquire nuclear weapons and is important reading for scholars and students of international relations, security studies, and political psychology.
Too often the effect of nuclear weapons on a state’s foreign policy is discussed without regard for the passage of time. Using political psychology, Michael Cohen examines historical cases and shows that new nuclear states learn from their brushes with disaster and come to appreciate that while their arsenals may protect them, they are too dangerous to provide leverage to make gains. This is a significant contribution to our knowledge.