Michael D. Cohen argues that nuclear weapons acquisition often does dangerously embolden the acquiring state to undertake coercion and aggression, but that this behavior moderates over time as leaders learn the dangers and limitations of nuclear coercion.

1. Introduction2. Psychology, Nuclear Crisis, and Foreign Policy3. The Soviet Union, 1956-19624. Pakistan, 1998-20025. Further Tests: Kennedy, Vajpayee, Nixon, and Mao6. Conclusion: When Proliferation Causes PeaceBibliographyIndexAbout the Author

Cohen's book has a number of admirable qualities. In addition to tackling a critically important question, the theory is refreshing in its focus on the experiences of individual leaders. . . . Cohen's book is an important step toward understanding the role of psychology and leader experiences in nuclear decision-making. * H-Diplo *An original, innovative contribution to security studies, and to contemporary attempts to develop leader-based theories of nuclear behavior. It charts a new path for scholars interested in pursuing application of cognitive biases in nuclear studies. * Perspectives on Politics *Too often the effect of nuclear weapons on a state's foreign policy is discussed without regard for the passage of time. Using political psychology, Michael Cohen examines historical cases and shows that new nuclear states learn from their brushes with disaster and come to appreciate that while their arsenals may protect them, they are too dangerous to provide leverage to make gains. This is a significant contribution to our knowledge. -- Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.An original, innovative contribution to security studies, and to contemporary attempts to develop leader-based theories of nuclear behavior. It charts a new path for scholars interested in pursuing the application of cognitive biases in nuclear studies....an important book that contributes new insights to the field of nuclear studies. * Perspectives on Politics *

Too often the effect of nuclear weapons on a state's foreign policy is discussed without regard for the passage of time. Using political psychology, Michael Cohen examines historical cases and shows that new nuclear states learn from their brushes with disaster and come to appreciate that while their arsenals may protect them, they are too dangerous to provide leverage to make gains. This is a significant contribution to our knowledge. -- Robert Jervis, author of How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics, Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies

Michael D. Cohen is a senior lecturer in security studies at Macquarie University in Australia. He is coeditor of North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. His articles have appeared in International Security, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, The Non-Proliferation Review, and Strategic Studies Quarterly.